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1. INTRODUCTION
Modem technology allows for the reproduction and transmission of
information better, faster, and more efficient than ever before. It is now just as
easy to communicate with someone on the other side of the planet as it is with
someone across town.' A message sent by electronic mail, commonly referred
to as e-mail, enables a sender to transmit anything on a computer to anywhere
in the world with a simple click of the mouse.2 No longer is it necessary to go
through the time consuming motions of drafting a letter, mailing it, and waiting
days for a reply.
E-mail has become a fixture in homes and offices all over the world. By the
year 2000, it is estimated that forty million e-mail users will be sending sixty
billion messages each year.3 Attorneys are among the growing number of
people who have switched from the more traditional forms of communication to
e-mail. E-mail is a commonplace means of communication among different
branches of the same law firm or company, as well as between lawyers and their
clients.4
The popularity of e-mail can be attributed to its unique advantages over
other forms of communication. E-mail documents cost less to store,S can be
edited and efficiently searched,6 and can disseminate information to several
destinations at once. Unlike telephone calls, e-mail creates written records of
communications, and allows users to send large documents and images by
attaching them to the e-mail message. E-mail avoids "telephone tag," allowing
people to respond to the e-mail when received rather than constantly trying to
catch each other on the telephone.7 In contrast to facsimile transmission, e-mail
can send information directly from a computer in a form that the recipient can
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Kondakjian v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, No. 94 Civ. 8013, 1996 WL
139782, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. March 28, 1996).
2. Ronald V. Grant, Law Office Technology, 1997-JUN Haw. BJ. 24, 32 (1997).
3. William J. Cook, Hypertext Bar Groups Need to Rethink Views of Privacy on the Internet,
Chi. Law., Jan. 1998, at 63.
4. Daniel i Pope, "Is It Safe.. .64 Def. Couns. J. 138, 141 (1997).
5. John Montana, Legal Issues in ED, 30 Rec. Mgmt. Q. 39 ("Eliminating paper saves money
at every step in a record's life. The cost of the paper itself is eliminated, distribution and storage
costs are also reduced, and the need for recipients to transcribe the information into their own
computer systems is eliminated.").
6. Todd Flaming, Internet E-mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 85 Ii. BJ. 183 (1997)
(E-mail messages can be drafted and sent in a fraction of the time it takes to send a letter,
computerized documents can be included by dragging and dropping an icon into the message body.
In contrast, letters typically require secretarial and other office assistance.).
7. Linda S. Brehmer, Making the Internet Useful, 48 A.L.I.-AB.A. 129, 137 (1997).
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edit and return. "E-mail also costs less than a fax, especially when used for
interstate or international communication."
s
Legal concepts must evolve to keep pace with new trends in technology.
The traditional approaches courts have taken in the past must be rethought in
light of new forms of communication. With the advent of this new technology
comes new risks. Many attorneys use e-mail to communicate with clients
without realizing the possible legal consequences. Once an e-mail message is
sent over the Internet, "it can be read by people whose identities may never be
known to the sender or receiver."9 And, for all practical purposes, the sender
has lost all control over an e-mail message once it is sent.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the possibility of waiver of the
attorney-client privilege'0 through the use of e-mail. It examines the different
manners of e-mail transmission, the risks associatedwith each, and what happens
when an e-mail message ends up in the hands of an unintended recipient. It also
discusses possible precautions that attorneys should take so that their e-mail
communications with their clients remain confidential. In considering whether
the attorney-client privilege is compromised through the use of e-mail, the courts
should look to the circumstances surrounding the transmission of the e-mail
document, more specifically, what mode was used to transmit the e-mail and
what measures were taken to ensure its security, both while in transit and in
storage.
II. THE ATrORNEY-CLENT PRVILEGE
A. In General
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common law privileges for
confidential communications." The United States Supreme Court recognized
8. Warren E. Agin, Encryption Takes the Worry out of E-Mailing, 25 Mass. L Wkly. 49
(1997).
9. Kevin J. Connolly, Cryptography Can Ensure E-Mail Confldentlality, Nat'l LJ., June 9,
1997, at B13.
10. It should also be noted that the same rules applicable in this comment to the attorey-client
privilege apply to the work product exception. Heidleberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus.,
Ltd., No. 95 C 0673, 1996 WL 732522, at *1 (N.D. I1. Dec. 18, 1996); see Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 508, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3) (1970) (The work product
immunity protects from discovery an attorney's thoughts, strategies, mental processes and opinions
prepared in anticipation of litigation.); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, Jr., 460
S.E.2d 677, 684 (W. Va. 1995) (Both protect litigants during discovery. The claimant bears the
burden of proving the requisite elements for both the privilege or exception including "a showing that
the communication originated in confidence, that it would not be disclosed, that it was made by an
attorney acting in his or her legal capacity for the purpose of advising a client, and that it remained
confidential.!).
!1. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2290, at542 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(The history of the privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I when the privilege was for the
consideration for the oath and the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of the
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
the need for the privilege as early as 1888.12 The "privilege protects the client
from compelled disclosure of communications with his or her professional legal
advisor made in confidence, unless the client has waived the privilege."' 3 In
Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of
the privilege "was to encourage full and frank communications between the
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of the law and administration of justice."'
14
The privilege enables clients to "make full disclosure to their attorneys" of
past wrongdoings,"5 so that the client may obtain "the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice."' 6 Full disclosure and free and
open communication helps to provide all the information necessary for the
attorney to represent the client fully."7 The privilege also recognizes that sound
legal advice does not "spring from lawyers' heads as Athena did from the brow
of Zeus," but instead depends "upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the
client."'" The privilege allows attorneys to assure clients that any confidential
information given to their attorneys will remain confidential. 9
Despite the gravity of the privilege, its use "obstructs the search for truth"
and its "benefits are at best indirect and speculative. 20 In United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Canady, the court noted that:
[T]he privilege is an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and
concrete .... It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy,
client In the early 1700's, the client became the holder of the privilege "when the desire for truth
overcame the wish to protect the honor of the witness') Id. at 543; In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13,
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
12. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 466, 9 S. CL 125, 127 (1888).
13. See Flaming, supra note 6.
14. 449 U.S. 383, 387, 101 S. Ct. 677, 683 (1981).
15. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S. CL 1569, 1577 (1976).
16. Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470, 9 S. Ct. at 127.
17. Patrick S. Grady, Discovery of Computer StoredDocuments and Computer Based Litigation
Support Systems: Why Give Up More Than Necessary, 14 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 523,
553 (1996); see also ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1 (1969):
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order
for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the
exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important
form the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer
to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full
development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages
laymen to seek early legal assistance.
18. In re Scaled Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Tatel, J., dissenting), rev'd, Swidler
Berlin v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998); UpJohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 101 S. Ct. at 683.
19. Alvin K. Hellerstein, A Comprehensive Survey of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine, 540 PLI/Lit 589, 608 (1996).
20. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual § 501.5, at 465 (1998) (citing Weil v.
Investment/Indicators, Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It
ought to be strictly confined within the logic of its principle. We
recognize the fundamental principle that "the public... has a right to
every man's evidence."2 "[E]xceptions to the demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search for truth."2
Still, "courts sustain the privilege in individual cases to accomplish its larger
systematic benefits--the greater law compliance and fairer judicial proceedings
resulting from the 'sound legal advice [and) advocacy' the privilege pro-
motes.""
B. Elements of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The party asserting the privilege has the full burden of establishing the
existence of the privilege.24 The essential common law elements of the
attomey-client privilege are:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a profes-
sional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communica-
tions relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at this instant permanently protected (7) from the
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the
protection be waived.'
Although the privilege originated in the common law, many jurisdictions
have codified the privilege.26 For example, Louisiana's statutory privilege is
comparable to the privilege at common-law. Under Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 506, the privilege attaches when there is (1) the existence of a "confiden-
tial" communication, (2) made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
legal services, and (3) the communication is between the client and his
lawyer."
21. United States Fidelity and Guar. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677, 684 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S. Ct 724, 730 (1950) (quoting John H. Wigiore,
Evidence § 2192 (3d ed.))).
22. Canady, 460 S.E.2d at 684 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S. CL
3090, 3108 (1974)).
23. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Jatel, J., dissenting), revId, Swidler
Berlin v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 101 S. Ct. at 683.
24. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,82 (2d Cir. 1973), stay denied, 413 U.S. 917, 93 S. Ct. 3068
(1973).
25. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th
Cir. 1989) (citing Wigniore, supra note 11, § 2292 (These factors are widely-accepted. However,
courts may vary in their treatment of elements of the privilege.)).
26. See 8 Wigmnore, supra note 11, § 2292, at 555.
27. La. Code Evid. art. 506.
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Two elements relating to the loss of the privilege, confidentiality and waiver,
have been the source of frequent litigation. 8 These two elements are of
particular importance in the context of e-mail and the risk of waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.
1. The Confidentiality Requirement
The privilege protects only those communications made between an attorney
and client that are confidential.29 It is essential that communications are
maintained in confidence." The privilege protects not only communications
made by the client to his attorney but also those communications from the
attorney to his client which would disclose the client's confidential communica-
tions. 1 The mere showing of a communication between client and attorney is
insufficient to prove the confidential nature of a communicationand the existence
of an attorney-client relationship by itself does not create a presumption of
confidentiality. "It is of the essence of the privilege that it is limited to those
communications which the client either expressly made confidential or which he
could reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the
attorney as so intended.""
Three generally accepted criteria must be met to establish confidentiality:
(1) "[t]he client must intend his communications with his attorney to be
confidential, (2) [t]he client's subjective intention of confidentiality must be
reasonable under the circumstances, and (3) the confidentiality must have been
subsequently maintained. A subjective expectation of privacy can sometimes be
ascertainedfrom the client's express intentions"; however, those intentions often
must be determined from the circumstances surrounding the communication."
Thus, the courts use both subjective and objective tests in discerning confidential-
ity. When considering. whether the privilege has been breached, courts focus on
the precautions taken to preserve the confidentiality as well as the parties'
reasonable expectation of privacy.3" This reasonable expectation of privacy can
28. David S. Smallman, The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent Waiver:
Internet Publication and Preservation of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 Tort & Ins. LJ. 715, 717
(1997).
29. Industrial Clearinghouse, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Div. of Emerson Electric Co., 953 F.2d
1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992).
30. United States v. Pipkens, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 426 U.S. 952,
96 S. Ct. 3177 (1976).
31. Guzzino v. Feltenmn, 174 F.R.D. 59, 61 (W.D. La. 1997).
32. Heidleberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 95 C 0673, 1996 WL 732522
(N.D. I1. Dec. 18, 1996).
33. McCormick on Evidence § 91 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1972).
34. William P. Matthews, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, the Internet, and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U. Kan. L Rev. 273, 283 (1996).
35. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Communication in the E-Mail Era: Deciphering the Risks and Fears,
Nat'l LJ., Aug. 4, 1997, at B9.
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be ascertained "by the form of the document as well as the circumstances and
nature of the exchange."36
One of the circumstances which indicates a lack of confidentiality is the
presence of a third person who is not the agent of either the client or the
attorney." A communication disclosed to third persons in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the communication is not indicative of a lack of
confidentiality." For example, in Brown v. State, the court held that statements
made by the defendant to a polygraph examiner hired by defendant's attorney
were privileged.39 The court reasoned that "the attorney-client privilege is
recognized as attaching to communications between the agent of an attorney and
the client, provided the communication is made to the agent upon the same
subject matter about which the attorney was consulted and the agent was retained
for the purpose of assisting him and rendering legal advice to or conducting
litigation on behalf of the client.'"0
2. Waiver of the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege exists only if it has not been waived.
The privilege is the client's alone, but his attorney or an agent acting
with the client's authority may waive it.4" In a corporation, the
corporation's management, i.e., the officers and directors, possess the power
to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege.42 The privilege may be
waived expressly if the "holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or
consents to disclosure of the matter or communication" or implicitly
through circumstances which are inconsistent with a reasonable claim of
36. Kobluk v. University of Minnesota, 556 N.W. 2d 573, 577 (Minn. CL App. 1996), rev'd
on other grounds, 574 N.W. 2d 436 (1998).
37. 8 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2312, at 604 (The presence of a third person (other than the
agent of either) is obviously unnecessary for communications to the attorney as such, however useful
it may be for communications in negotiation with the third person.).
38. David J. Haydon, Identifying and Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in Various
Business Transactions, 61-OCT J. Kan. B.A. 24,26; see also McCormick, supra note 33, § 91 ("In
cases where the client has one of his agents attend the conference, or the lawyer calls in his clerk or
confidential secretary, the presence of these intermediaries will be assumed not to militate against the
confidential nature of the consultation, and presumably this would not be made to depend upon
whether the presence of the agent, clerk or secretary was in the particular instance reasonably
necessary to the matter in hand.").
39. 448 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ind. 1983).
40. Id.
41. Hebert v. Anderson, 681 So. 2d 29, 32 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 684 So. 2d 936
(1996); see McCormick, supra note 33, § 91.
42. Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, No. 95 C 7487, 1996 WL 204324, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49, 105 S. Ct.
1986 (1985).
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confidentiality.43 A voluntary disclosure which is inconsistent with the
confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship waives the privilege. 44
Revealing a privileged communication to a third person generally destroys the
privilege. For example, in United States v. Hamilton, the United States Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the party waived any privilege when he
voluntarily disclosed confidential information to his cellmate.45 On the other
hand, the privilege remains intact "if the third party shares a community of
interest with the privilege holder."4 "A community of interest arises when two
parties have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a
communication between an attorney and a client regarding legal advice.
4
A party asserting claims or defenses that put his attorney's advice at issue
may also waive the privilege.4s This is exemplified when an attorney is sued
by a client for malpractice49 or a defendant asserts reliance on the legal advice
of an attorney.50
M. ELECTRONIC MAIL GENERALLY
"[El-mail is a means of transmitting messages or computer files between
computers."'" It is essentially the electronic equivalent of mailing a letter.
5
'
E-mail, like postal mail, has a facility, known as a "mailbox", that stores
messages until the user recipient can read them.53 Each user has a unique
"address" to send and receive messages so that messages are not received by the
wrong person.' Only the owner of the mailbox, or someone who has the
password to the mailbox, can access what has been sent.
43. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see, g., Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing cases).
44. Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993).
45. 19 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1994).
46. Heidleberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 95 C 0673, 1996 WL 732522
(N.D. fl1. Dec. 18,1996) (citing Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., No. 84 C 5103, 1987 WL
12919, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1987).
47. Heldleberg Harris. Inc., 1996 WL 732522, at *2; Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 1987
WL 12919, at *2.
48. See United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, Jr., 460 S.E.2d 677, 688 (W. Va.
1995).
49. Id.; see also 8 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2327, at 638.
50. 460 S.E. 2d at 688; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470, 9 S. Ct. 125, 127 (1888) (client
waived privilege when she alleged as a defense that she was misled by counsel); Chevron v. Pennzoil
Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (party's claim that its tax position was reasonable because
it was based on advice of counsel puts advice at issue and waives privilege).
51. Jonathan Rose, E-Mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client Privilege, 23
Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 179 (1997).
52. Grady, supra note 17, at 529.
53. Matthews, supra note 34, at 274.
54. Id.
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The e-mail process is quite simple. When a user sends an e-mail message,,
the user's computer stores the original document and produces a copy which it
sends to a file server."5 The file server stores the copy and produces another
copy which it sends to another file server.56 "Depending on the computer
network structure, the e-mail message may go through two or more servers, with
each storing its own copy and making new copies to forward to the intended
recipient.""7 Since each file server stores a copy of the original, deleting the
original user's copy only "deletes" that copy; "other copies of the document will
reside with other recipients and file servers." 8 These other copies may stay in
these file servers for days or possibly even months.5
The fact that the file server keeps a duplicate copy of the e-mail message
makes communicatingby e-mail distinguishable from other forms ofcommunica-
tion. Communicating by telephone merely requires only recorded disclosure of
the soutce and destination.6  Communicating by postal mail only requires
disclosure of the destination of a communication.61
In addition, "unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not 'sealed' or
secured, and can be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the
sender and recipient."62 Thus, sending e-mail is more like sending a post card
rather than a sealed envelope through the postal system. However, an e-mail
message may not be accessed or viewed by these intermediary computers if it is
encrypted.6 -
"Encryption is the process of converting data (stored in digital form as a
series of ls and Os) into an incomprehensible code through the use of an
algorithm."'  Only users with the proper key can read the encrypted mes-
sage.65 By encrypting an e-mail document, unintended recipients cannot read
the message."
55. Betty Ann Olmstead, Electronic Media: Management andLitigatlon Issues When "Delete"
Doesn't Mean Delete, 63 Def. Couns. J. 523, 524 (1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 525 ("E-mail messages... are never actually 'deleted.' The delete command does
not actually remove the message from the computer, it only... marks the file as reusable. The e-
mail message is still there and will remain unchanged until the message is written over or until
someone knowledgeable about computers runs a software program to clear old messages.").
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Yochai Benkler, Rules of the Road for the Information Superhighway: Electronic
Communication and the Law (1996).
62. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also
Cook, supra note 3.
63. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
64. Ian C. Ballon, Intellectual Property Protection and Related "Third Party" Liability, 482
PLI/Pat 559, 648 (1997).
65. Id.
66. See Agin, supra note 8.
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E-mail may be transmitted by several different means. E-mail messages may
be sent through a private or local area network (LAN),' through semi-private
networks or commercial services, or through any combination of these
methods.6" Another method of transmission is the Internet. The Internet is the
most widely used mode for the transmission of e-mail between attorneys and
clients.69 Since the security of an e-mail message is related to the manner
chosen to send the e-mail, each means of transmission must be analyzed
separately.
IV. ANALYSIS OF E-MAIL AND THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. E-mail Sent Through a Private or Local Area Network
Private networks and local area networks operate on a system accessible only
by other computers on the same system (e.g., within the same office, firm, or
organization)." It is a closed system and e-mail messages sent from one
computer to another computer go directly with no intermediary stops. Therefore,
the electronic messages may only be accessed from within the organization
owning the network. Such communication should be deemed sufficiently
confidential provided that there are adequate procedures in place to ensure that
unauthorized employees do not have access to the e-mail systems. In United
States v. Keystone- Sanitation Co., the court held that e-mail messages between
attorneys of the same law firm maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy."
B. E-mail Sent Through a Commercial Provider
Semi-private or commercial services operate by providing e-mail access to
anyone who pays a fee.72 Messages are sent from one computer to the
commercialnetwork where they are stored and subsequently accessedby another
member of the service using a password. 3 These commercial providers can
guarantee system security for messages and files sent and received within the
respective individual service. 74 However, this security ends when messages are
transferred to the Internet because these commercial providers have no authority
to trace e-mail sent outside their systems.7 These commercial providers do not
67. A LAN is a group of computers connected together so that information can be sent between
computers.
68. See Rose, supra note 51, at 196.
69. Id.
70. See Cook, supra note 3.
71. 903 F. Supp. 803 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
72. Commercial providers include MCI Mail, CompuServe, America Online and Prodigy.
73. See Cook, supra note 3.
74. See Rose, supra note 51, at 210.
75. Id. at 198.
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know through which intermediary computers the e-mail message has or will pass
in the chain of transmission-e-mail messages attach the route that they have
been through so the file servers will appear on the message. Thus both the client
and the attorney must be members of the same service to be protected by the
security of the commercial provider.
When an attorney and client communicate via e-mail, the client should be
aware that the communication will be disclosed to his e-mail provider for
transmission.7' It is irrelevant whether the message is first conveyed from the
attorney to the client. It is the client's knowledge that determines the effect of
the disclosure, and the client should be aware that the message will pass through
his commercial provider whether the message is sent first from the attorney or
the client. However, is this disclosure to the commercial provider enough to
destroy the client's intention of confidentiality?
Although the e-mailmessage is technically"disclosed" to the e-mail provider
and arguably destroys any confidentiality, better reasoning would hold that this
is not indicative of a lack of confidentiality. This disclosure is not a revealing
of the contents of the message as is the case when the client or the attorney
normally disclosed to a third party the contents of the message. The disclosure
of the e-mail message to these intermediary computers is necessary for the
transmission of the communication. "Rather than being accidental or distinctly
separate from the process of communication between the client and the lawyer,"
the disclosure is an integral part of the communication.'
In addition, although system administrators generally have easy access to all
communications transmitted through their computer networks," they are only
allowed to read e-mail messages as necessary incident to the rendering of their
services or, if necessary, to protect their property. 9 This access should not
destroy the privilege since the access by system administrators is severely
limited. In comparison to another common form of communication,
"lawyers routinely make use of the convenience of overnight delivery
without fear that any privilege is waived or secret improperly revealed,
even though the back of the airbill makes it clear that the carrier has an
unconditional right to open any envelope or package for any reason or for no
76. See Benkler, supra note 61.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2Xa)(1) (1994). Section 2511(2XaXi) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer,
employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are use in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept,
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to
the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a
provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing
or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
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reason." 0 Moreover, the e-mail provider is essentially serving as an agent of
either the client or the attorney, similar to the role of secretaries, who have not
threatened the privilege in the past."'
E-mail on a commercial network has been held to be subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The court, in United States v. Maxwell, addressed the
issue of privacy in e-mail messages waiting to be retrieved from the online
computer service America Online."2 The court found that such users have an
objective expectation of privacy, both as senders and recipients, in e-mail
messages waiting to be retrieved by or from specific individuals. The court
focused upon the passwords assigned to the network subscribers, holding that
there was virtually no risk that the e-mail messages would be receivedby anyone
other than the intended recipients. "The appellant clearly has an objective
expectation of privacy in those messages stored in computers which he alone
could retrieve through the use of his own assigned password," and he likewise
"had an objective expectation of privacy with regard to the messages he
transmitted electronically to other subscribers of the service who also had
individually assigned passwords."83 The court even made a comparison of e-
mail to the telephone, noting how communication by e-mail is "extraordinarily
analogous" to a telephone conversation because it is "transmitted from one
computer to another via telephone communication, either hard line or satel-
lite.9'u
However, the decision may not extend to e-mail sent over the Internet.
There is a crucial difference between the e-mail transmissions in Maxwell and
Internet e-mail. The e-mail massages sent in Maxwell were wholly within
America Online's system, i.e., the e-mail was sent to and stored only in
computers owned by AOL. The court noted that e-mail messages sent over AOL
are "afforded more privacy than similar messages sent over the Internet because
they are privately stored for retrieval on AOL's centralized and privately-owned
computer bank." 5 AOL had a policy "not to read or disclose subscribers' e-
mail to anyone except authorized users... offering its own contractual privacy
protection in addition to federal statutory protections." 6 In comparison, "the
Internet has a less secure e-mail system, in which messages must pass through
a series of computers in order to reach the intended recipient."
8 7
80. David Beckman & David Hirsch, Making Encryption the Norm, 83-Sep. A.B.A. .1 82
(1997).
81. See Paul R. Rice et al., Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 5:20 (1993).
82. 45 MJ. 406 (C.AA.F.), rev'g In part 42 MI. 568 (U.SA.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
83. Bert L Slonim, E-Mail and Privileged Communications, Nat are the Security Concerns,
218 N.Y.LJ. 101 (1997) (citing Maxwell, 42 MJ. at 576).
84. Maxwell, 45 MJ. at 417.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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C. E-Mail Sent Over the Internet
The biggest concern over waiver of the attorney-client privilege in
connection with e-mail arises when an e-mail document is transmitted over the
Internet. The Internet is the most widely used manner of transmitting e-mail
Even if a firm's e-mail system uses a commercial provider such as America
Online or MCI Mail, an e-mail message will pass over the Internet for at least
part of its destination if the communication is to a person using the Internet for
e-mail."'
1. The Internet Generally
The Internet is a series of interconnected networks of computers connected
and accessed through the telecommunications infrastructure, 9 that is, the phone
lines and exchanges throughout the world connect the Internet.9  E-mail
messages sent over the Internet may pass over dozens of computers, "owned and
operated by disparate public and private entities92 on its way to its final
destination."93 The result is a "decentralized, global medium' of communica-
tions" which is not administered by a single entity.9 Intermediary computers,
called "routers",95 copy each message and send it to the next one until it reaches
88. Charles R. Merrill, E-Mail for Attorneys from A to Z, 68-Jun N.Y. St. BJ. 20,22 (1996).
89. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("In terms
of physical access, there are two common methods to establish an actual link to the Internet. First
one can use a computer or computer terminal that is directly (and usually permanently) connected
to a computer network that is itself directly or indirectly connected to the Interet. Second, one can
use a 'personal computer' with a 'modem' to connect over a telephone line to a larger computer or
computer network that is itself directly or indirectly connected to the Internet.").
90. An exchange is a central office in which telephone lines are connected to permit
communication.
91. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. Internet e-mail generally travels over wire cables, much like
a landline telephone call. The Internet e-mail is temporarily resident on each of those computers and
could be stored in any one of those computers.
"The Internet had its origins in 1969 as an experimental project of the Advanced Research Project
Agency ("ARPA"), and was called ARPANET. This network linked computers and computer
networks owned by the military, defense contractors, and university laboratories conducting defense-
related research. The network later allowed researchers across the country to access directly and to
use extremely powerful supercomputers located at a few key universities and laboratories. As it
evolved far beyond its research origins in the United States to encompass universities, corporations,
and people around the world, the ARPANET canie to be called the 'DARPA Internet' and finally
just the 'Internet.' Id.
92. Id. Some of the computers and computer networks that make up the Internet are owned
by governmental and public institutions, non-profit organizations, and some are privately owned.
93. Mary Frances Lapidus, Using Modern Technology to Communicate with Clients: Proceed
with Caution and Common Sense, 34 Oct Hous. Law. 39 (1996).
94. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
95. Flaming, supra note 6; see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. In 1996, there were
approximately 9,400,000 routers worldwide.
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its destination." A communication sent over the Internet could take any of a
number of different routes to its destination." A message sent from a computer
in New Orleans, Louisiana, to Los Angeles, California, might first be sent to a
computer in Houston, and then to a computer in Dallas, and then to Denver, Las
Vegas, and San Francisco, before finally reaching its destination in Los
Angeles." "If the message-could not travel along that path (because of military
attack, simple technical malfunction, or other reason), the message would
automatically (without human intervention or even knowledge) be re-routed"
within a matter of seconds." In addition, e-mail messages sent over the
Internet do not necessarily travel over the same path. "The Internet uses 'packet
switching' communication protocols"® that allow individual messages to be
subdivided into smaller 'packets' that are sent independently to the destination,
and are then automatically reassembled by the receiving computer.'.'
2. Analysis of E-Mail Sent Over the Internet
E-mail sent via the Internet is not as secure as e-mail sent via a LAN or a
commercial provider. Commercial providers can protect the confidentiality of
those messages for their subscribers when the message is sent and received
within their system; but once the message is conveyed over the Internet, their
protection ends.' 02 Also, there is no contractual agreement between the owners
of the routers and the client as compared to a commercial provider and its client.
In fact, once e-mail is sent over the Intemet, the sender usually has no idea
"where it will go and whose computer it will pass through" on its route to the
recipient.'0 3 Hence, if client A, using America Online as its e-mail provider,
sends a "confidential" communicationto attorney B who uses an e-mail provider
other than America Online, A and B should know that the message is contained
within AOL's system as well as B's service provider. However, neither the
client, the attorney nor the commercial provider knows where else this message
might be stored or who has access to it.
However, does the mere fact that these messages are stored in these
intermediary computers destroy any reasonable expectation of privacy? The
owners of these intermediary computers are prohibited by federal law, in the
96. Flaming, supra note 6.
97. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
98. Id. at 831-32.
99. Id. at 832.
100. Matthews, supra note 34, at 275. "A protocol is a specification of how two different
systems are to communicate with each other via some kind of network. A protocol often has
conversational rules, which prescribe what is sent first by one of the systems in one format and what
the response can be from the other system."
101. Robert J. Posch, Jr., Another fin for Internet Self-Regulation, 60 Direct Mkt. 5 (1997).
102. Rose, supra note 51.
103. Ronald V. Grant, Office Automation: ComputerHardware and Software, 1997-JUN Haw.
BJ. 33.
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same manner as the client's commercial provider, from monitoring e-mail
messages for purposes other than assuring quality of service or maintenance.' °
In fact, this access restriction is exactly the same as that placed on "telephone
companies which likewise are permitted to monitor conversations for service and
maintenance of the network"; 0 s yet there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in telephone communications." This prohibition should be enough to warrant
a finding of a subjective expectation of privacy even though the e-mail message
is stored in these unknown intermediary computers.
In Dunlap v. Rudder, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that despite a telephone line's susceptibility of monitoring, "a reasonable person
could have an expectation of privacy for conversations conducted" over the
monitored line."7 In dicta, the court stated that "the capability of monitoring
does not create implied consent to any monitoring that occurs. Cellular
telephones and electronic mail are both technologies of questionable privacy, but
we nonetheless reasonably expect privacy in our cell phone calls and email
messages." ' Likewise, monitoring by e-mail providers should not warrant an
implied consent to any monitoring of e-mail messages that occurs and constitute
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
There also exists the threat of interception by hackers, both in the transmis-
sion of the message and in its storage. A hacker (technically "cracker" is the
proper term) uses special software to gain access to the e-mail message."°
Hackers use programs called "sniffers" to search for key words in mail
that is coming across the Net. They can search for the sender's address
or the recipient's address .... Once target mail is found, the message
data is stored on the hacker's computer. Even though some e-mail is
broken down into numerous data packets before it is sent across the Net,
a sniffer program can pluck each data packet from the data stream and
then reassemble the complete text.... Another type of program lets
the hacker configure his machine to resemble the intended recipient's
machine including its address. This is called "spoofing." A spoofer can
intercept an e-mail message, concoct a false reply, and, if he or she
wants, doctor the original message and send it on to the intended
recipient."'
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2Xal(1994).
105. Slonim, supra note 83; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2Xa) (1994).
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (The Supreme Court first recognized that
a right to privacy in telephone communications in holding that evidence obtained by means of a
listening device placed outside of a phone booth was inadmissable on Fourth Amendment grounds
because the caller had a reasonable expectation of privacy.).
107. 1997 WL 414380 (9h Cir. 1997).
108. Dunlap v. County and Rudder, 1997 WL 414380, at *3 (9th Cir. 1997).
109. Flaming, supra note 6.
110. Aaron Grossman, Is Opposing Counsel Reading Your E-Mail?, Mass. Law. Wkly., Nov.
18, 1996, at B4.
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
Although there exists the possibility of interception, "Internet e-mail is
protected by the essential federal statutory privacy protections that apply to
telephone conversations.""' Title 18 makes it a federal crime to intercept "any
aural, wire, or electronic communications by any person... [and] prohibits the
use or disclosure of unlawfully intercepted communications."'" 2  "Wire
communications" mean any aural transfer (i.e., transfer containing a human
voice) made in whole or in part through wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and point of reception."3  "Electronic
communications mean any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical sys-
tem.""14 Hence, "during the period of time an Internet e-mail message
is in transit from one computer to the next, the transmission is protected
... just as if it were a normal landline telephone call."' Therefore,
under Title 18, "there is no greater insecurity when the Internet communi-
cation is in transit over the phone lines than there is with an ordinary
phone call." 6
The greater risk to the unauthorized access by hackers exists in the routers
which relay the message and maintain a copy of the message. Although there
is potential exposure through each router, "each of these computers may handle
thousands or even millions of messages per day among thousands of different
persons and entities."" 7 One writer said that "the odds of finding a needle in
a haystack are greater than the odds that a computer hacker would successfully
locate a particular message from a lawyer to the client.'. However, one
commentator believes that it is "cold comfort at best" to rely on the sheer
volume ofpacketspassing through these computers in defending the confidential-
ity of a communication." 9 This is especially true in light of the fact that there
are ways of identifying potentially interesting packets without reviewing each of
them for content."'" Still, "because courts require lawyers to take 'reasonable
precautions' to ensure that the privileged communication is made and maintained
in confidence, it should be enough if the lawyer ensures that the communication
111. Slonim, supra note 83.
112. Albert Gidari, Privllege and Confidentialty In Cyberspace, 13 No. 2 Computer Law. 1
(1996).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (12) (1994).
115. Slonim, supra note 83.
116. Gidari, supra note 112, at 2.
117. Lapidus, supra note 93, at 40.
118. Arthur L Smith, E-Mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege (visited Dec. 13, 1998)
<http.//www.abelaw.com/baslpm/email.hm>.
119. Connolly. supra note 9.
120. Id. atBl4 n.3 ("A determined snooper can use traffic analysis to restrict searches to e-mail
originating at law firms, high-tech companies or particular e-mail accounts.").
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is properly addressed and that the client has established procedures to ensure that
the communication is received in confidence..''
Congress, recognizing the threat of network hacking, enacted the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986. The ECPA makes it unlawful to
"intentionally access without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided."'" It also makes it unlawful to exceed an
authorization to access a facility and thereby alter, obtain, or prevent "authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic stor-
age. "1123
There are, however, several exceptions to the ECPA which "allow a party
to intercept access, or use communications."" 4 The government may do so for
"law enforcement, administrative or national securitypurposes"; serviceproviders
may do so for "system maintenance or the protection of the rights or property of
the provider;" and a party may intercept and use an electronic communication
where that "electronic communication is readily accessible to the general
public."'2
The limited access by the government is so limited that it should not destroy
the privilege. Likewise, as explained above, the limited access by service
providers should not destroy the privilege. Under the third exception, the
communication must be readily accessible to the general public. In Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., the court found that documents available for copying
from a university library, being published on the Internet, and available on CD-
ROM were within the public domain.'26 In contrast, e-mail documents sent
over the Internet are not readily accessible to the general public. They are sent
to specific individuals and can only be lawfully accessed by those individuals.
The fact'that there is special software which allows for hackers to intercept e-
mail messages can hardly be said to be readily accessible to the general public.
Also, Congress has made it clear that essentially any communication carried over
a communication system provided by a telecommunications carrier is deemed not
to be readily accessible to the general public. While there exists the
possibility that e-mail messages can be intercepted, identifying one of the
computers in which the message is located and subsequently locating, isolating
and capturing "a particular message would take an investment in time and
money-not to mention personnel who are both technically proficient and willing
to violate the law."'2" In addition, the privileged nature of a communication
121. Smith, supra note I 18.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(aXl) (1994).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(aX2) (1994).
124. Id.
125. Karen L Hagberg, Shadow Data, E-mail Play a Key Role in Discovery, Trial, N.Y.U.,
June 16, 1997, at 53,510.
126. 896 F. Supp 590, 595 (E.D. La. 1995).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994).
128. Pope, supra note 4 (citing William Frievogel, Communicating with or about Clients In the
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does not turn on whether interception of the communication is possible, but
rather whether the communication was made in 'confidence' and whether any
disclosure by a party to the communication is intentional or inadvertent."'' 9
It is not required nor possible to have one hundred percent security when
communicating with clients by any means of communication. 3 '
V. OTHER FoRMs oF COMUNCATION (RELATED TEHNoLoGIEs)
The risk of interception is not unique to e-mail. Other forms of communica-
tion are equally at risk of being intercepted. It is impossible to guaranty the
security of any communication. Equipment necessary to tap a regular telephone
line can be purchased for less than twenty-five dollars at most local electronic
stores.' Yet, "the fact that some individuals eavesdrop on regular telephone
conversations does not mean that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
for ordinary phone calls."' 32 In the context of the attorney-client privilege, it
is only necessary that the means of communication is reasonable, not that it is
impenetrable.
E-mail is protected from interception by federal law the same way that
written mail is protected by federal law from interception, "just as telephone
voice messages or fax messages are protected from interception by the [Flederal
[W]iretap [A]ct.".. Therefore, in light of present legislative protections, e-
mail should be seen as a reasonable means of communication for transmitting
confidential communications much the same way that written mail and telephone
calls are.
There are no cases which directly address the issue of whether e-mail sent
over the Internet is subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Still, the
prohibition on the interception of e-mail communications and the restrictions on
the e-mail providers, while not preserving the privilege, are indicative of an
objective expectation of confidentiality; and therefore, the mere showing that the
communication was sent by e-mail over the Internet should not destroy the
attorney-client privilege.
VI. INTERCEPTED E-MAIL
Although the mere transmission of e-mail is insufficient to warrant a finding
that there is no attorney-client privilege, does the interception of e-mail lead to
the waiver of the privilege? Just as there is no privilege waiver when written
Internet, 7 Alas Loss Prevention J. 18 (Jan. 1996)).
129. Pope, supra note 4.
130. Leibowitz, supra note 35.
131. United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 179 n.10 (5th Cir. 1992).
132. Id.
133. Richard M. Georges, The Impact of Technology on the Practice of Law-2010, 71-May Fla.
BJ. 36, 38 (1997).
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mail is stolen, the interception of e-mail by criminal conduct should not lead to
the waiver of the privilege when reasonable precautions have been taken to
ensure its confidentiality.
In Section 2517(4) of Title 18, Congress provided that "[n]o otherwise
privilegedwire, oral, or electronic communicationinterceptedin accordancewith,
or in violation of, the provisions of 'this chapter shall lose its privileged
character." Thus, the interception or access of e-mail communications while in
transit or storage, assuming they meet all the other requirements of the attorney-
client privilege, should not result in the loss of the privilege if they are
intercepted.
In In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Securities Litigation, the court found that
there was no waiver where the defendant's privileged documents, referred to as
the Curry "diary" or "chronology", came into a reporter's possession and was
published, all without the client's permission. 14 The reporter indicated that he
obtained a copy of the diary from an unidentified source. 3 The court held
that, "absent any indication that [the defendants] voluntarily gave the diary to the
[press], publication of excerpts of [the privileged documents] should not be
considered a waiver of the privilege."'36 Likewise, if an e-mail message is
intercepted and printed in the press or given to an unintended recipient, a waiver
should not be found, provided that reasonable precautions were taken to ensure
its confidentiality.
VII. INTERNAL SEcuRiTY EMPLOYED BY LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
The reasonableness of e-mail as a mode of communication also depends on
the policies for use, retention and destruction of e-mail implemented by both the
law firm and the client. Communications which are intended to be confidential
but are intercepted despite reasonable precautions remain privileged. 37 Issues
to be considered in determining whether reasonable precautions have been taken
include: Who routinely has access to e-mail? Is access determined by a
password? Could anyone in the company retrieve the message? Are confidential
communications routinely deleted, printed in hard copy or transferred to disk?
Due to the permanent nature of e-mail documents, attorneys and clients must
be wary of their system of controls over e-mail storage, use and destruction.
Unlike the shredding of a paper document, the mere hitting of the delete button
does not destroy the document. Even if the user's copy is successfully deleted,
there are other copies which exist that will be unaffected.'38
134. 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
135. Id. at 469.
136. Id. at 470.
137. Id.
138. Olmstead, supra note 55.
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Procedures for periodic retention and destruction of electronic docu-
ments should be established, maintained and monitored. These
procedures should consider all potential copies of electronic documents:
backups and archival tapes; operating systems that create logs of data
files; "off the end" data stored on magnetic tapes not overwritten
when the tapes are reused to store other information; PCs
connected in a LAN... that may contain independent storage capacity;
laptops; and floppy diskettes containing documents not transferred to the
main system. ' 9
Attorneys should make sure that such precautions are taken and that they
advise their clients to do the same to ensure that the attorney-client privilege is
maintained.
VIH. INADVERTENT DIscLOSUREs
While it is evident that a voluntary disclosure of information which
is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney client relationship
waives the privilege, 40 there is no consensus as to the effect of an
inadvertent disclosure of confidential communications. 4" There are several
different ways that an e-mail document may inadvertently end up in the
hands of an unintended recipient. An e-mail message could be "placed in
the wrong box when delivering responses to a discovery request"; 42 a
secretary could mistakenly hit the wrong key on the keyboard, sending the
e-mail document to the wrong recipient; or a privileged e-mail could be
"accidentally produced when responding to a voluminous discovery re-
quest."1
4 3
Courts have used "three different tests when deciding whether the inadver-
tent production of a privileged document waives the attorney-client privi-
lege."" The three tests are: the "strict test," the "lenient test" and the
"middle test. ,
141
139. Id. at 527.
140. See Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S.
1065, 109 S. CL 2064 (1989); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 466 U.S. 944, 104 S. Ct. 1927 (1984).
141. Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993).
142. Dorothea Beane, Inadvertent Disclosure of Attorney-Client Privileged Material: Putting
the Horse Back in the Barn, 69 Fla. BJ. 67 (1995). Unlike paper correspondence, it is extremely
easy to inadvertently misaddress an e-mail. Computer users typically address e-mail from an online
directory and simply click on the wrong recipient's address.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 68.
145. Roberta D. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis ofa Consequence oflnaaverently
Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 Cath. U.L Rev. 465, 471-74
(1993).
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A. The Strict Test
Some courts apply the strict test, finding that the privilege is lost once there
has been a disclosure to third parties, "even if the disclosure is unintentional or
inadvertent.' 46 The Fourth Circuit reasoned, in In re Sealed Case, that "the
amount of care taken to ensure confidentiality to the holder of the privilege
reflects the importance of that confidentiality to the holder of the privilege." 147
Thus, a disclosure, although inadvertent, is indicative of the lack of concern over
confidentiality in the message.
These courts follow a traditional view expressed by Wigmore that any
disclosure of a privileged communication is a waiver, no matter what
precautions were taken to avoid it: All involuntary disclosures, in
particular, through the loss or theft of documents from the attorney's
possession, are not protected by the privilege, on the principle... that,
since the law has granted secrecy so far as its own process goes, it
leaves to the client and attorney to take measures of caution sufficient
to prevent being overheard by third persons. The risk of insufficient
precautions is upon the client. This principle applies equally to
documents.
4
This approach is disadvantageous to the client in that it takes from him the
ability to control when the privilege will be waived; "the privilege for confiden-
tial communications can be lost if papers are in a car that is stolen, a briefcase
that is lost, a letter that is misdelivered, or in a fascimille that is missent."'49
It is also inconsistent with "the Supreme Court's admonition that courts should
apply the privilege to ensure a client remains free from apprehension that
consultations with a legal advisor will be disclosed."'50
B. The Lenient Test (No Waiver Rule)
Other courts apply the lenient test, or "no waiver" rule,"5' finding that the
"mere inadvertent production [of privileged documents] does not waive the
[attorney-client] privilege."'5 These courts never find a waiver of the
146. Allread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d. 1425 (5th Cir. 1993); see, eg., In re Sealed Case,
877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir.
1984).
147. 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
148. Berg Electronics, Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261,262 (D.C. Del. 1995); 8 Wigniore,
supra note 11, § 2325, at 633.
149. Berg Electronics, 875 F. Supp. at 262.
150. Id.
151. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404 (D.NJ. 1995).
152. Harding, supra note 145, at472 (citing Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753
F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
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privilege unless there has been a deliberate disclosure.' There are two
reasons behind this view. First, the client is the holder of the privilege, not the
attorney, so an act of the attorney cannot constitute a waiver of the privi-
lege."" Second, "a 'waiver' is by definition the intentional relinquishment of
a known right, and the concept of an 'inadvertent waiver' is therefore inherently
contradictory."' 5 Thus, as one court concluded, "if we are serious about the
attorney-client privilege and the client's welfare, we should require more than
... negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed to have given up the
privilege.' 5 6
C. The Middle Test
Still, the majority of the courts have chosen to apply the middle test, opting
for "an approach which takes into account the facts surrounding a particular
disclosure" in determining whether the inadvertent disclosure has waived the
privilege." This approach "focuses upon the reasonableness of the steps taken
to preserve the confidentiality of privileged documents."'5 The Fifth Circuit
has adopted this view in discerning whether the inadvertent production of
privileged documents results in a waiver of the privilege."5 9 Courts following
this approach find that a disclosure resulting from gross negligence
constitutes a waiver of the privilege. "Inadvertent disclosures are, by definition,
unintentional acts, but disclosures may occur under circumstances of such
extreme or gross negligence as to warrant deeming the act of disclosure to be
intentional."W
Courts that have adopted the middle test employ a multi-factor analysis when
determining whether documents have lost their privilege through inadvertent
disclosure. The factors they consider are: (i) precautions taken to prevent
inadvertent disclosure in view of extent of document production; (ii) number of
inadvertent disclosures; (iii) extent of disclosures, and delay in rectifying
disclosure; and (iv) whether overriding interests of justice would be served by
153. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, 160 F.R-D. 437, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
154. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 410 (D.NJ. 1995).
155. Bank Brussels Lambert, 160 F.RD. at442; Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp.
951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
156. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.
157. Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993); se4 eg., Transamerica
Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646,650-52 (9th Cir. 1978) (privilege
waived only if privilege holder voluntarily discloses communications); Parkway Gallery Furniture,
Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50-52 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (limited
inadvertent disclosure will not necessarily result in waiver); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen,
Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938-39 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (inadvertent production is the antithesis of the
concept of waiver so that mere inadvertent production by attorney does not waive client's privilege).
158. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.NJ. 1995).
159. Lapidus, supra note 93.
160. Bank Brussels Lambert, 160 F.R.D. at 443.
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relieving party of consequences of error.'6 The presence or absence of one
factor of the test is not determinative of a finding of waiver. Rather, the courts
will look to all the factors in considering whether a party has undertaken
reasonable precautions to avoid inadvertent disclosures of privileged documents.
IX. ENCRYPTION
Though intercepted or inadvertently sent e-mail which is not encrypted
should not result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the advantage
inherent in the privilege can nevertheless be lost. For example, the contents of
a privileged e-mail communication could end up on the front page of the
newspaper or in the opposing counsel's hands, regardless of whether the
communication retains its privileged status. To safeguard against such a result,
attorneys should encrypt any highly-sensitive material that they do not want to
end up in the press, especially if the message will be transmitted over the
Internet. With good encryption, "the only security risks come from someone
stealing the private encryption keys, or someone tricking you into thinking he's
your client."'62
There are several drawbacks to the use of encryption. Both the attorney and
the client must have the encryption software.'63 In addition, certain encryption
technologies may not be exported outside the United States and Canada.'"
"Some countries, such as France, Russia and China, prohibit use of encryption
technology entirely."'65 This makes encryption programs of limited value in
international communications.
The use of encryption has been suggested by some as necessary to preserve
the attorney-client privilege when a document is sent by way of e-mail.'"
These authors suggest that the risk of interception makes unencrypted e-mail an
unreasonable mode of communication for preserving the attomey-clientprivilege.
Although simple e-mail, i.e., e-mail that is not encrypted, can be intercepted
and read upon interception, the failure to use encryption should not indicate a
party's lack of an expectation of confidentiality. Confidentiality does not turn
on whether the communication is capable of being intercepted. All that is
required is that the parties reasonably expect the communication to be confiden-
tial. No communication is entirely secure, and e-mail is no exception. In light
161. See, eg., F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482-84 (E.D.
Va. 1991) (balancing the above factors and finding the privilege waived); Golden Valley Microwave
Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 204, 209 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (finding the privilege
waived due to counsel's failures to take precautions to prevent disclosure and to rectify error); Bud
Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding the privilege
waived based on the above factors, especially the "overriding issue of fairness").
162. G. Burgess Allison, Technology Update, 22 No. 3 Law Prac. Mgmt. 12, 20 (1996).
163. Agin, supra note 8.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Connolly, supra note 9; Agin, supra note 8.
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of the legislation which makes it illegal to intercept e-mail, there should be a
finding of an objective expectation of privacy even when using simple e-mail.
Although encryption should not be necessary to preserve the attorney-client
privilege, attorneys should be aware of the risks involved when using simple e-
mail and should advise their clients of the risks of interception. Because there
is a risk of interception, highly sensitive material should either be encrypted or
not sent over the Internet." Attorneys should also discuss the benefits of
encryption with their clients. "Out of an abundance of caution, an attorney might
get a written consent from the client, but the better reasoned authorities do not
require client consent."6
X. POLICY CONCERNS
The attomey-clientprivilege is designed to encourage a client to speak freely
and fully with his attorney in confidence so that the attorney can fully represent
him. The law should grant protection to the client for this privilege whenever
it is evident that communications between attorney and client are made in
confidence and that expectation of confidentiality is reasonable. The law should
not put a stranglehold on the means of communication between a client and his
attorney, especially where, as here, such means are reasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances.
The advantages present in e-mail communication make it a popular choice
of communication in-house, among different branches of the same law firm,
among different branches of the same company, and betweenlawyers and clients.
"With increasing frequency, attorneys and their clients are turning to electronic
mail to speed the flow of information and documents back and forth. No longer
is it adequate to rely on the mail, or even next-day document delivery servic-
es."' 69 The law needs to reassure clients that confidential documents will not
be disclosed simply because e-mail was used to exchange the information. If
courts should step in and rule that the use of e-mail does constitute a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege then the whole purpose of the privilege, to "encour-
age full and frank communications between the attorneys and their clients," will
be frustrated.170
XI. STATE OPINIONS
There is no clear consensus among the states as to whether Internet e-mail
is privileged. The South Carolina State Bar Association said, in September 1997,
that "Internet e-mail was secure enough to raise a reasonable expectation of
167. Slonim, supra note 83.
168. Id.
169. Smith, supra note 118.
170. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S. Ct. 677, 682 (1981).
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privacy and could.., be used by attorneys and clients to communicate.''
This determination is in line with the New York Bar Association, the Vermont
Bar Association, and the Illinois State Bar Association.172
The Illinois State Bar Association stated that "lawyers may use electronic
mail services, including the Internet without encryption to communicate with
clients unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures."'7 3
Such unusual circumstances would be those "involving an extraordinar[ily]
sensitive matter that might require enhanced security measures like encryption,
but in such situations, ordinary telephone and other normal means of communica-
tion would also be deemed inadequate."' 74 The Illinois opinion was based on
the fact that "the expectation of privacy for e-mail is no less reasonable than for
ordinary telephone calls" and that "the unauthorized interception of e-mail
subject to ECPA is illegal."' 75 The Vermont opinion was based on the premise
that since "any phone call can be tapped, legally or otherwise, and the mails and
faxes can be intercepted and read.., no reason exists to treat e-mail different-
iy."1
76
In contrast, authorities in Iowa and North Carolina "hold that it is unethical
to use the internet unless the communications are encrypted or the client has
consented."' 1" These authorities base their opinions on a concern for the
security of the Internet, especially the fact that operators of the intermediary
computers can read the messages and that "e-mail is susceptible to interception
by anyone who has access to the computer network to which a lawyer 'logs-on'
and such communications are rarely protected from interception by anything
more than a simple password."'78 In so deciding, the Iowa and North Carolina
opinions overlook the "federal statutory protections afforded to e-mail and the
technical difficulties attendant to interception."'7 9
XII. CONCLUSION
The law must evolve to meet society's needs and demands for modem
technology without imposing an undue burden upon the use of such means. It
should recognize that modem technology involves new risks. Old laws must be
reevaluated in light of this new technology and its inherent risks, taking into
account all the surrounding circumstances. To merely say that the risk of e-mail
interception makes it an unreasonable means of communication is to turn a blind
171. Cook, supra note 3.
172. Slonim, supra note 83.
173. Cook, supra note 3.
174. Slonim, supra note 83.
175. Id.
176.. Id.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. (citation omitted).
179. Id.
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
eye towards the reality of modem society. There now exists the inherent
possibility of intercepting any form of communication: facsimile, phone, mail,
and even person to person conversations. There is no communication means
which is risk free. If someone wants to obtain information illegally, they are
going to find a way to do so, no matter how safely guarded the information.
The possibility of interception is not the standard by which communication
means are adjudged confidential or not. Rather, the communicationmust be seen
as providing a reasonable expectation of privacy to its user; and e-mail by
whatever means does just that.
Transmission of a communication by way of e-mail should not destroy the
attorney-client privilege, whether it is sent through a LAN, by a commercial
provider, or over the Internet. There is legislation already in place which should
allow for a client to make an unencrypted e-mail communication with his
attorney in confidence and without fear of waiving the attorney-client privilege.
Still, attorneys must be wary of the risks of simple e-mail and advise their clients
accordingly, especially since there are no court decisions deciding the issue with
respect to the Internet. Encrypting e-mail, which makes it unreadable to an
unintended recipient, can alleviate the fear of an e-mail message ending up in the
hands of an unintended recipient and should be used with highly sensitive
documents; but it should not be required of all confidential documents. It must
ultimately be remembered that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients."'' 0
To lose sight of this is to forget that the privilege exists to protect the client so
that he can have confidence in his attorney and in the law itself.
Ben Delsa
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